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THIS PAPER IS AN analysis of a community college district's attempt to
introduce computer technology into the operation of its five libraries. In
spite of the fact that the conversion from the Dewey Decimal Classifi-
cation system to the Library of Congress Classification (LCC) system,
which initiated the effort, began about nine years ago, the basic causes of
failure are as relevant today as they were then because they are rooted in
the minds of those responsible for them: librarians, computer specialists
and institutional executives. Involved in the project were five libraries
serving the district's five campuses, a centralized acquisitions and
processing unit (referred to here as library technical services or LTS)
responsible for ordering and cataloging materials for the district's five
libraries, and the district's computer center.
The efforts to convert to the LCC system, produce new catalogs for
the district's five libraries, and automate the cataloging process were in
every respect an unmitigated disaster for the 30,000 students in the dis-
trict, the faculties of the colleges, and the taxpayers who unknowingly
poured several hundred thousand tax dollars into the project and had
nothing to show for it. The impact of the failure was particularly severe on
the newest of the five campuses, which accepted its first class of students
about a year after the Dewey-to-LCC conversion project began and
entered its third year without a usable catalog to its collections and little
hope of having even a minimally acceptable tool for at least another year.
The only ones able to ride serenely through the lamentable episode were,
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of course, the administrators in the district headquarters who knew noth-
ing about libraries as either technical or educational institutions, and who
were unwilling to heed the advice of those who did, even after paying
handsome consultant fees to obtain it.
This story is based entirely on documents produced by the indi-
viduals and groups involved in the conversion project. These documents
include minutes of meetings of the planning group, project status reports,
miscellaneous memoranda related to the project, and two consultants'
reports, one commissioned before the conversion project got underway,
and the other after its failure could no longer be ignored.
The story begins on February 19, 1969, when, after more than one
and one-half years of argument and discussion, the instructional materials
committee (IMC), composed of the heads of the four campus libraries, 1
the head of LTS and the vice-president for academic affairs, finally agreed
to recommend the adoption of the LCC system to the president and
governing board of the community college district. Since hundreds of
libraries had previously followed this same path, the committee's recom-
mendation was hardly noteworthy except for the unconscionably long
time it took to produce it. Several factors, however, made it the equiv-
alent of opening Pandora's box.
In the first place, the decision to adopt LCC was not really the result
of a critical assessment of its merits as opposed to those of the Dewey
Decimal system, but was rather an act of desperation, the roots of which
lay in the failure of LTS to acquire and process library materials in a
manner congruent with the needs of the four campus libraries or of any
library for that matter. The heads of the campus libraries and the aca-
demic vice-president believed that shifting from the Dewey Decimal sys-
tem to LCC would somehow compensate for the lack of management and
technical expertise which had crippled the operation of LTS since its
inception.
The reasons for LTS's failure are all too common to the history of
such organizations. The director had no authority to develop and enforce
standardized systems, procedures and products. Everything the unit did
had to be unanimously approved by IMC, which meant it had to cater to
the idiosyncratic practices of all four of the libraries it served. In addition,
the quality of the work produced was seriously deficient. For instance,
when the librarian for the newest campus in the system arrived on the job,
she found that books had been ordered for the "turnkey collection" sole-
ly on the basis of whether or not three of the four original libraries already
held them, with no regard for changes in curriculum, or outdated or
superseded material. She further discovered that all books ordered for the
new library had their file access point determined by untrained student
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assistants, which resulted in multiple copies (e.g., one copy ordered under
editor, two or three under works, and one under publisher) and that in
creating the collection, no thought had been given to standing orders or to
the need for back runs of journals and serials.
It is conceivable that inspired and competent management might
have overcome to some extent the constitutional weakness of governance
by a committee, but these qualities were sadly lacking at the time the
conversion project was undertaken. In the face of these conditions, it is
not surprising that at the time it was decided to adopt LCC, the un-
processed backlog in LTS was approximately 11,000 volumes2 and the
average time between placement of an order by one of the campus li-
braries with LTS and receipt of a fully cataloged and processed document
was an unbelievable 502 days. 3
Given this chaotic situation, and the magical qualities attributed to
technology by the uninitiated, it is really not surprising that as IMC
moved toward its final recommendation to adopt LCC, the computer
loomed larger and larger in discussions of how to handle the conversion
project and ongoing technical services operations. Thinking in this direc-
tion had certainly been stimulated by the district president, who had
communicated to IMC his interest in exploring the use of the computer to
upgrade library services to students and faculty.4 As IMC studied the
problem of reclassifying 104,000 titles representing approximately 129,000
volumes, the computer began to emerge as the deus ex machina not only
for creating the necessary new catalogs, but for overcoming the undeni-
able performance deficiencies of LTS. The willingness to believe that it is
possible to superimpose sophisticated computer technology over basi-
cally inefficient manual operations and achieve anything other than chaos
has probably caused more "computer failures" than any other variable;
what emerged in the case under discussion is a perfect example.
Several weeks before IMC finally decided to undertake the reclassifi-
cation project, the committee chairman had, in the course of a trip through
California, spent "a few hours"5 in the library of Foothills College, which
had recently completed a reclassification project of 50,000 volumes. The
project had taken just thirty-seven days and the computer had been used
to produce book pockets and spine labels.6 In a memorandum to the
district president on his return (which in many respects is the key docu-
ment in this case study), he noted that his visit to Foothills College "be-
gan to open the door to a new look at the conversion project utilizing the
computer."7 It also opened the door to ultimate disaster. A project which
for so many months had seemed complex and costly suddenly appeared
simple and cheap. The typists in LTS would be trained as keypunch
operators. The shelflist would be punched on tab cards. "Then," he
continued euphorically, "the computer will enter the picture and provide
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us with conversion labels, catalog cards, book catalogs and any other
service we may require. The actual conversion of our present hold-
ings . . . will be done between semesters in the year 1969/70. . . . With
the libraries closed (during the summer) and with adequate student help,
we should complete the process in a crash program [before the start of fall
semester]."8 This reference to the use of student help is significant. After
the conversion process actually got underway, both students and clerical
help were employed to convert bibliographic records into machine-
readable form without adequate training, supervision or checking opera-
tions. The result was that even had LTS and the computer center been
able to solve the programming and hardware problems which plagued the
conversion project, the quality of the resultant catalogs would have been
so low as to make their production an exercise in futility insofar as the
needs of librarians or library users were concerned.
Attached to the memorandum from the chairman of IMC to the dis-
trict president recommending the conversion project was a tentative cost
study of two alternate methods to produce the new catalogs for the cam-
pus libraries, one using xerography and the other the computer. For the
former, the estimated cost was $92,000, for the latter, $24,000. Signifi-
cantly, the figure for the computer-based alternative did not include the
costs of software development, testing, debugging or computer time, and
neither approach considered the costs to the campus libraries for such
things as gluing on book pockets and spine labels and inserting book
cards.9
Enthusiasm for the computer alternative permeated the entire memo-
randum. Not only would the computer produce byproducts not possible if
xerography were used, but the unit cost would be approximately twenty
cents per volume as compared to approximately seventy-one cents. The
chairman of IMC had caught a glimpse of the best of all possible worlds. A
computer-based project would not only be better in terms of overall bene-
fits, but it would also be cheaper.
These cost estimates are a perfect example of the willingness of the
naive to believe in miracles. Less than a month before they were trans-
mitted to the district president, IMC had rejected as unrealistic the per-
volume conversion cost of fifty cents reported by Daniel Gore in the May
1968 issue of College and University Business. 10 However, once the com-
puter moved to center stage, almost anything seemed possible even a
per-volume cost that was half what Gore reported. Later cost estimates
eventually produced a budget for a computer-based conversion project of
almost $65,000. n This figure, however, like the previous estimates, did
not include either computer center or campus library costs, and it still
projected a unit cost which IMC had previously rejected as unrealistic.
Lost in the IMC chairman's idyllic vision was any remembrance of
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the difficulties reported by the head of the Foothills College library with
the computer aspect of its conversion project, which among other things
forced the abandonment of the original plans for the book catalog. In a
long description of the project sent to the chairman of IMC's Subcom-
mittee on Planning and Development, edited here for clarity, the librarian
wrote:
Computer problems? They are impossible to enumerate. You
name it and it happened. The programming was inadequate and
the computer continually stuttered. The Dewey control number
was used for producing the spine labels [book pockets and book
cards]. At times, the computer would tear madly on for 100
labels printing an identical Dewey number with different LC
numbers. If .5 was a good decimal, why not double it and make it
.5.5? The big problem at Foothills was that the IBM people
simply did not understand library terminology or needs, and they
were more interested in what they thought they could do than in
producing what the library said it needed. 12
This last comment, born of firsthand experience, echoes a standard
joke among computer users about IBM, which paraphrases John F.
Kennedy's well-remembered plea in his inaugural address, "Ask not what
IBM can do for you, but what you can do for IBM." Unfortunately, its
implicit message to the neophytes in IMC about to undergo their first
encounter with the magic machine went undetected.
Captured in the communication of the IMC chairman to the district
president outlining the potential of the computer, and in the words of
warning contained in the letter from the head of the library at Foothills
College, are the primary causes of what is called, in a totally illogical way,
"computer failures"; they are not computer failures at all, but the failure
of human beings to use technology effectively. In spite of the fact that
almost two decades have elapsed since the first large-scale attempt at
Florida Atlantic University (FAU) to link computers and libraries, the
attitudes which produce the human failures continue to exhibit a dis-
turbing vitality. On one hand, there is the groundless enthusiasm ex-
hibited by the IMC chairman with respect to the complexity and costs of
computer-based library systems; and on the other hand, there is the
equally naive arrogance of the computer specialists who often promise
more than they are ultimately willing to produce. To combine these at-
titudes with managerial and technical incompetence, which was the case
in the example under discussion, will yield the inevitable result unmiti-
gated disaster.
About a year before the die was cast to opt for a computer-based
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conversion project and an ongoing automated processing system, IMC
recommended that a team of consultants be hired. The recommendation
was approved and a contract was signed with Donald W. Johnson, As-
sistant University Librarian, Arizona State University, and James M.
Turner, Jr., Systems Analyst, Wisconsin State University at Whitewater.
The consultants were charged with evaluation of "the [district's] process-
ing center together with the possible applications of electronic data
processing methods not only to the operations of the Center, but also to
the member Libraries." 13 In May 1968, the consultants submitted their
report. Had the district followed its major recommendations, it is possible
that not only would a successful reclassification project have resulted, but
a solid foundation might also have been laid for an eventual transition to
some kind of computer-based processing system.
Although the consultants attempted in every way possible to cushion
the impact of their findings, these were of such a nature as to make it
impossible to do so. Their conclusions were as follows:
1 . That the conversion could not be undertaken with any hope of success
without a complete administrative reorganization of LTS.
2. That entirely new manual processing systems and procedures had to
be developed with the necessary manuals in order to clear out existing
and prevent future backlogs.
3. That a new head of LTS should be recruited nationally rather than
from district personnel, and that this person be given authority con-
gruent with the responsibilities of the position.
4. That only after all of this had been achieved should the conversion
project be undertaken and planning begin for the eventual automation
of the processing system.
5. That xerography should be used in the conversion project for the crea-
tion of the new catalogs for the campus libraries.
Insight into the depressing situation which the consultants found in LTS
can be seen in one of their summary comments. "The picture we have
painted," they wrote, "attended as it is with a host of recommendations,
could incline the reader to the view that everything is now in such a mess
as to be hopeless." 14 This turned out to be an extremely prophetic state-
ment.
None of the consultants' major recommendations was acted upon.
IMC, stung by having the deficiencies of LTS (and by implication, its
own) clinically revealed, pulled into a defensive shell. Its appreciation of
the report, forwarded to the district president on June 6, simply noted the
desirability of beginning the reclassification project on September 15,
1968. Nothing was said about the method to be used. 15 Nine months
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elapsed between the submission of the consultants' report and the final
decision to reclassify the collections and produce new card catalogs from
an automated cataloging data base. It was during this period that the
chairman of IMC visited Foothills College and came under the spell of the
computer. The recommendations in the consultants' report (regarding the
necessity of complete reorganization of LTS before considering the pos-
sibilities not only of automation but the reclassification project itself)
were forgotten, andonMarch5, 1%9 the countdown toward disaster began.
The budget for the project was set at $64,677 and the target date for
completion January 1, 1970.
The monthly status reports from the head of LTS to the district
president and the governing board began on a predictably optimistic note
and, just as predictably, progressively degenerated into a litany of mount-
ing problems and extended deadlines, ending with the final collapse of the
project two and one-half years after it was launched. At the end of the first
month, the head of LTS happily noted that "no problems have arisen to
alter plans for producing the card catalogs for the campus libraries be-
tween the first and second semesters of the academic year." 16 In the
report covering the project through the month of August, note was made
of the first problems with developing the necessary programming, and the
district president and the governing board were prepared for the first
extension of the January 1, 1970 deadline. The September report read:
As we noted last time, our programming has been falling some-
what behind. Partly this has been because of the problems we
have had in fully utilizing the "talent" at the Arizona State
Prison . . . [nevertheless] at this point in the project, we still
continue to move reasonably well and there seems to be no
compelling reason why we cannot meet our calendar require-
ments of physically converting all present book holdings be-
tween semesters. The next three months will be critical, how-
ever, and there is always the possibility that we may have to
change to the alternative plan of converting at the end of the
second semester. 17
The reference to utilizing the talent in the state prison refers to the fact
that there were insufficient keypunchers in LTS and an effort was made to
have some of the work done by the inmates enrolled in an ADP training
program. The idea had merit, but only if the proper training, supervision
and checking were supplied by LTS. These basic elements of an efficient
processing system, as Johnson and Turner had pointed out, were, how-
ever, missing in LTS's own operations. Consequently, the prison key-
punching operation only compounded the bibliographic chaos being
created within LTS itself.
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Within another month, the head of LTS expressed serious concern
over not obtaining sufficient computer time to complete the project on
schedule. After five months of the project, it was estimated that the
printing time alone for spine labels, book cards and catalog cards would
come to 318 hours, and that getting that much time on a multipurpose
computer serving the needs of an educational establishment of over
30,000 students was going to be a major problem. 18
The December status report confirmed the earlier hints of a resched-
uling because of programming problems and the unavailability of com-
puter time. The completion date for the project was reset at June 1970.
Somehow, extending the deadline six months seemed to create the im-
pression that the problems hounding the project would dissipate and the
report ends on a new note of optimism: "As matters now stand," wrote
the head of LTS, "everything is proceeding smoothly. . . . We should be
ready on time." 19
Three months passed and anxiety once again replaced optimism. The
status report for March 1970 warned that "strenuous and extensive ef-
forts" would be needed to meet the new deadline. This document is
unusually significant in that it unconsciously reflects the growing sense of
panic on the part of the head of LTS, the chairman of IMC, and the head
of the computer center over the status of the project. In a budget summary
at the end of the report, mention is made of planning for "disaster-
averting contingencies" and the probable availability of funds to com-
pensate for "legitimate disasters."20 This latter phrase is intriguing. In
mentioning the possibility of a "legitimate disaster," perhaps the authors
viewed themselves cast in the role of the Greek tragic hero good men
doomed to destruction through no fault of their own. In any event, the
concept presupposes that there are illegitimate disasters as well as legiti-
mate ones produced by the attempt to unite computers and libraries, and
that it is somehow possible to distinguish them. However, it is probably
best to leave this kind of philosophical speculation to John Kountz, whose
specialty is dealing with such semantic enigmas.
In June 1970 the project had entered its second year and the deadline
for completion had to be extended again. This time it was set for the break
between summer and fall semesters. The status report for the month also
noted that the processing of current acquisitions (which had ceased a year
before when the conversion project had begun) would soon be underway
again and that the campus libraries could expect some completely proc-
essed material by the opening of school in September. 21 The librarians
were to be as disappointed in their hopes of this as they ultimately were
for the successful completion of the conversion project. As a matter of
fact, the conversion project and its mounting problems absorbed most of
the limited energies of LTS for the two and one-half years of the project's
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existence, and during this period, the flow of current acquisitions to the
campus libraries was slowed to a trickle.
The months rolled by and in April 1971, two years after the conver-
sion project began, the district president sent a memo to all concerned
congratulating them on its successful completion. At an IMC meeting
several days later, the representatives from the campus libraries de-
manded to know the reason for these congratulations, since they were still
without usable catalogs and had no hope of receiving them in the near
future. The head of LTS acknowledged that he had written to the presi-
dent informing him that the project had indeed been completed, and he
considered this to be so since the union shelflist was in the computer and
three of the five libraries had recently received new individual shelflists.
In his view, the catalogs for the campus collections were immaterial and
besides, they would arrive in due time.
Obviously, the heads of the campus libraries could not accept this
kind of self-serving sophistry and they expressed the view that it was
incumbent on the head of LTS to clear up the misunderstanding which he
had created in the president's office.22 Since he was not inclined to do so,
they were forced to take their complaint directly to the district president.
They pointed out that not only were the campus libraries still without
usable catalogs, but that even if all of the technical problems which
plagued the project could be overcome, producing the catalogs from the
unedited, error-laden data in the computer would be nothing short of a
Pyrrhic victory. The district president was unmoved and supported the
view of the head of LTS that the project had been completed; the fact that
the campus libraries were still without catalogs was beside the point.
(This incident in some ways is reminiscent of Art Buchwald's solution for
ending the Vietnam War. All that was needed, he said, was for the United
States to choose a propitious moment to declare itself the victor and then
march off the field of battle.)
Nevertheless, it is probable that the complaints of the campus li-
brarians had some impact, because shortly afterward, the district presi-
dent invited Dr.Robert Hayes of the consulting firm Becker and Hayes,
Inc. to audit the project. Dr. Hayes spent one day in LTS and submitted a
report on June 4, 1971, stating that: "It is unlikely that the conversion
project of your LTS division as presently scheduled will be completed as
of the beginning of fall semester, 1971. The completion of the catalogs will
probably require six months or more."23 He proposed that the com-
munity college district engage his firm for a period of six months during
which it would produce a "management program for delivery of catalogs,
completion ofbacklog cataloging and management ofLTS operations."24
Hayes's proposal is a particularly bothersome aspect of this case
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study. It is possible that his firm could have provided the management
and technical expertise to produce the new catalogs within six months,
but the question of whether or not it was worth doing was never addressed
in his report to the district president. During his one-day site visit, the
campus librarians had documented the unsatisfactory quality of the bibli-
ographic data in the computer. Yet, in spite of this, he recommended
producing the ''base catalogs from the files as they now exist with correc-
tions as they now are known."25
Several explanations are possible for this recommendation which
ignores one of the fundamental weaknesses of the conversion project
the unreliable data going into the computer. The most plausible explana-
tion, however, is the tendency of the computer specialist to believe that
anything technically possible is always desirable. A similar situation oc-
curred at FAU where numerous postmortem sessions with the director of
the computer center failed to convince him that the technical accom-
plishment of producing the first computer-based university library cata-
logs was completely negated by the miserable quality of the bibliographic
data they contained. The district did not accept Hayes's offer, and it is
just possible that some perception of the soundness of the adage "garbage
in garbage out" had developed from the district president's confronta-
tion with the campus librarians. Perhaps someone belatedly remembered
the Foothills College library director's warning that computer experts are
often more interested in what they can do than in producing what a library
needs.
In any event, another year went by before the pretense that the
conversion project and LTS itself were anything but a shambles was
finally relinquished. By July 1972 the district had initiated a pilot project
for purchasing book-processing kits from 3M Corporation and Richard
Abel Company in an attempt to reduce the accumulated backlog of un-
processed material.26 In addition, the largest library in the system was
ordering its books directly from vendors instead of through LTS, and
two other libraries were using the catalog of a nearby university library in
order to correct the mistakes on the card sets supplied by LTS. In short,
centralized acquisitions and processing for the five campus libraries had
totally collapsed under the impact of the computer-based conversion
project.
As a reward for presiding over the debacle, the head of LTS was
given a sabbatical leave in the summer of 1972 to study for a doctorate in
library science, and the head of the computer center was appointed in-
terim head of LTS. His appointment was accompanied with both a man-
date to investigate the causes of the inefficiency of LTS and the authority
to take whatever steps were necessary to correct the situation. Since he
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was one of the important contributors to the disaster, the irony of his
appointment was a fitting climax to the entire unfortunate affair. For three
years students had suffered varying degrees of aggravation, frustration
and deprivation trying to use libraries without adequate catalogs (or in the
case of the newest library, without a catalog at all). For three years
faculty had been annoyed, inconvenienced and distracted from their
teaching. Much time had been wasted in fruitless meetings and probably
more than one-half million dollars had been wasted in direct and indirect
project costs.
The fundamental cause of the project's failure was incompetence
combined with a bad case of narcissism on the part of the administrators,
librarians and computer specialists involved. This was evidenced by
IMC's rejection of the major recommendations of the original con-
sultants' report which had forcefully pointed out the need to reorganize
LTS completely under a new head, recruited from outside the district,
before attempting the conversion project. An idea of the unfitness of this
unit to acquire and process materials for five libraries may be demon-
strated by the facts that, at the time of the consultants' visit, it did not
possess a complete copy of the National Union Catalog, did not own the
latest edition of the Union List ofSerials, did not subscribe to New Serial
Titles, did not maintain a subject authority file, and did not even have an
automatic edge-gluer.
It is important to remember that the IMC chairman was the academic
vice-president of the district who, on his own authority, could have
recruited a new head of LTS with the kind of managerial and technical
expertise which had been lacking since the day LTS was formed. Instead,
he chose to believe that his perception of the situation in LTS and his own
knowledge of the technical aspects of buying and processing books was
more acute than that of the specialists he had called in as consultants. The
same attitude came into play when he disregarded the advice of the head
of the library at Foothills College to temper enthusiasm for a computer-
based project with a critical assessment of what it would take to make it
successful. It should be noted here that in spite of the problems en-
countered at Foothills College, a determined, hard-nosed, competent li-
brarian succeeded in overcoming them, and that a major reason for her
success was the absence of an overarching bureaucracy with the capa-
bility of stifling professional competence through its inevitable tendency
to prevent anyone from "rocking the boat."
When the folly of attempting a computer-based conversion project
without first bringing LTS to an acceptable state of efficiency became
evident, it was impossible for anyone involved in the decision to admit it.
Consequently, in spite of mounting costs and disastrous results, the
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project ground on until it died of its own inertia rather than through
administrative action. As a sidelight, it is worth noting that in the summer
of 1970, a library administrator and a computer specialist who had been
closely involved with the failure of the larger and more complex com-
puter-based library project at FAU joined the staff of a nearby university
library. By this time, the conversion project was a little more than a year
old and in serious trouble. Yet neither of these individuals was ever
consulted about the causes of the failure at FAU or the lessons to be
learned from it.
I wish we could say with some confidence that, as we approach the
end of two decades since the first large-scale attempt to develop fully
automated library systems, experiences such as the one just related are
unlikely to recur. I cannot, however, as the attitudes which cause them
are not easily eradicated. Of more importance is the possibility that fail-
ures in the future, the consequences of which will dwarf anything de-
scribed here, may go unrecognized.
With the freezing of the card catalogs in the Library of Congress
approximately two years hence, and with LC's implementation of AACR
II, the era of the automated cataloging data base will finally have arrived.
Many would argue that this landmark event in the history of librarianship
occurred some five or six years ago when OCLC became operational, but
the fact remains that for libraries subscribing to its services, OCLC is
primarily a source of machine-produced catalog cards rather than a means
of escaping both the escalating costs of maintaining card catalogs and the
physical and intellectual limitations such catalogs impose on library users.
In a sense, OCLC's brilliant success has had a mesmerizing effect on a
large part of the profession by fixing librarians' gazes on the wonders of
computer-produced and alphabetized catalog cards when they should be
fixed on moving as rapidly as possible toward relegation of the card
catalog to its honorable niche in library history. If we fail to move aggres-
sively in this direction, it will be a computer failure born not so much of
ignorance, naivete and incompetence (as in the case study just presented)
as of a kind of smug satisfaction and a desire to bask in the warmth of
yesterday's accomplishments. However, despite its parentage, a failure
of this nature will be no more legitimate than the one whose history has
just been reviewed.
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